Explaining the Normative by Stephen Turner

Posted on August 15, 2025 by Luke Ford

Amazon.com notes:

Normativity is what gives reasons their force, makes words meaningful, and makes rules and laws binding. It is present whenever we use such terms as ‘correct,’ ‘ought,’ ‘must,’ and the language of obligation, responsibility, and logical compulsion. Yet normativists, the philosophers committed to this idea, admit that the idea of a non-causal normative realm and a body of normative objects is spooky. Explaining the Normative is the first systematic, historically grounded critique of normativism. It identifies the standard normativist pattern of argument, and shows how this pattern depends on circularities, assumptions about the unique correctness of preferred descriptions, problematic transcendental arguments, and regress arguments that end in mysteries.
The book considers in detail a paradigm case: legal normativity as constructed by Hans Kelsen. This case exemplifies the problems with normativist arguments. But it also shows how normativism was constructed as an alternative to ordinary social science explanation. The normativist argument is that social science explanations themselves are forced to rely on normative conceptsÑminimally, on normative rationality and on a normative view of ‘concepts’ themselves.

Empathic understanding of the reasoning and meanings of others, however, can solve the regress problems about meaning and rationality that are central to the appeal of normativism.

From this 2010 book:

These claims have regularly come to grief when the time comes to explain what normativity means, where it comes from, and why it is that what is normative in one social setting or intellectual context is not normative in another. The last issue, the problem of local normativity, is especially important. Different groups of people, different professions, users of different languages have different norms. The fact that what counts as correct, true, or valid differs from setting to setting compels us to recognize that this variation is, in some sense of this problematic term, “social.”Unsurprisingly, answers to questions about the source and authority of norms traffic in sociological concepts. Community plays a central role in Saul Kripke’s discussion of rule-following in Wittgenstein (1982, 56, 79–81, 89–109 passim) and in subsequent discussions of the problem. Collective intentionality is central to Sellars, who reinterprets Kant’s notion of rational beings in terms of a rational collectivity of rational beings whose collective intentions are the source of the binding character of reason (DeVries 2005, 266–67; Sellars 1968, VII § 144: 225, 226; 1967, 411).1 Do these usages mean that the end of the regress is in sociological facts? Kripke’s seems to – it ends, or appears to end, in actual communities. Sellars’s community of rational beings, however, is entirely virtual. The normativist can deny that there is an issue here and say that the relevant sociological concepts, such as community, are themselves dual concepts, with both a normative and a sociological sense. This allows them to say that the sense of community needed to account for the normativity of rule-following is the normative sense rather than the sociological. Or they can argue that such concepts as “practice” are normative rather than causal (Rouse 2002, 19–22).
Each of these arguments has problems. But the dual-character argument opens a door that normativists do not want to open; a door to a dualism in which the normative has no explanatory or metaphysical significance at all. The issue appears in a particularly sharp form in connection with the program known as SSK, the sociology of scientific knowledge. SSK operates with what it takes to be a naturalistic notion of reason, in which reasons figure as causes of the beliefs of scientists. But SSK wishes to remain neutral with respect to questions about validity, and objects, in the words of David Bloor, to “the intrusion of a non-naturalistic notion of reason into the causal story” ([1976] 1991, 177, cited in Friedman 1998, 245). This insistence, Michael Friedman suggests,
rests on a misunderstanding. All that is necessary to stop such an “intrusion” of reason is mere abstinence from normative or prescriptive considerations. We can simply describe the wealth of beliefs, arguments, deliberations, and negotiations that are usually at work in scientific practice, as Bloor says above, “without regard to whether the beliefs are true or the inferences rational.” In this way, we can seek to explain why scientific beliefs are in fact accepted without considering whether they are, at the same time, rationally or justifiably accepted. And in such a descriptive, purely naturalistic enterprise, there is precisely enough room for sociological explanations of why certain scientific beliefs are accepted as the empirical material permits. Whether or not philosophers succeed in fashioning a normative or prescriptive lens through which to view these very same beliefs, arguments, deliberations and so on, is entirely irrelevant to the prospects for empirical sociology. In this sense, there is simply no possibility of conflict or competition between “nonnaturalistic,” philosophical investigations of reason, on the one hand, and descriptive, empirical sociology of scientific knowledge on the other. (1998, 245)
This is a very rich statement, and it provides an alternative picture, with a distinctive but nevertheless impeccably Kantian pedigree, for an account of the relation of the causal or sociological and the normative that does not invoke normativity as something in the same explanatory domain as the causal, that is to say as a fact which is relevant to explanation.
Friedman prefaces this statement by asking “why SSK represents itself as in conflict or competition with traditional philosophy. Why do we not simply acknowledge the fundamental divergence in aims and methods and leave it at that?”

Posted in Ethics | Comments Off on Explaining the Normative by Stephen Turner

The Kingdom

Posted on August 14, 2025 by Luke Ford

I’m enjoying the ESPN documentary series on the Kansas Chiefs – The Kingdom.

The Chiefs are coached by Andy Reid, who’s long had clock-management issues.

I remember watching Super Bowl XXXIX (February 6, 2005) and the Eagles, then coached by Reid, were trailing by ten points deep into the fourth quarter and were not running a hurry-up offense. What the heck?

Just like taking a tiny amount of blood can give you a vital read of someone’s condition, so too a glaring dysfunction on one NFL drive can give you a vital read on the deficiencies of some big stars.

Grok says:

The Philadelphia Eagles, trailing 24-14 against the New England Patriots with 8:35 left in the fourth quarter, did not use a hurry-up offense effectively during their final significant drive. Here’s why, based on game accounts and analyses:McNabb’s Physical Condition: Donovan McNabb was physically drained after taking multiple hard hits, including a notable one from Richard Seymour. Teammates like Freddie Mitchell and Jon Runyan later said McNabb was winded, mumbling plays, and possibly hyperventilating, which hindered his ability to lead a fast-paced, no-huddle offense.
Poor Clock Management: Head coach Andy Reid and offensive coordinator Brad Childress were criticized for not pushing a hurry-up approach. The Eagles huddled up, taking 3:45 to drive 79 yards for a touchdown, leaving only 1:55 after a failed onside kick. Terrell Owens noted that clock management was the responsibility of the coaching staff and quarterback, indicating a lack of urgency.
Patriots’ Defensive Pressure: The Patriots’ defense, under Bill Belichick, targeted McNabb’s mobility and wore him down with physical play, including uncalled late hits. This left McNabb less capable of executing a high-tempo offense.
Team Dysfunction: Reports suggest internal issues, with McNabb struggling to call plays clearly, forcing teammates like Mitchell to step in. Earlier mistakes, like an interception in the fourth quarter, also cost valuable time.
Despite this, McNabb completed 8 of 10 passes on the touchdown drive, showing resilience, but the combination of physical exhaustion, coaching decisions, and defensive pressure prevented a true hurry-up offense.

Andy Reid, despite being a highly successful NFL head coach, has faced consistent criticism for clock management issues in playoff games, particularly during his tenures with the Philadelphia Eagles and Kansas City Chiefs. Below are prominent playoff games where Reid’s clock management decisions were notably criticized:

2. 2013 AFC Wild Card Game (January 4, 2014) – Kansas City Chiefs vs. Indianapolis Colts

Context: The Chiefs led 38-10 in the third quarter but lost 45-44 in a historic collapse, the second-largest blown lead in NFL playoff history.
Clock Management Issue: While Reid’s clock management wasn’t the sole reason for the loss, his failure to control the game’s tempo in the second half contributed to the Colts’ comeback. The Chiefs’ offense slowed down, and Reid’s conservative play-calling allowed Indianapolis to dictate the pace, with Andrew Luck leading a 35-point comeback. Critics noted Reid’s inability to manage the clock effectively to protect the lead.

Impact: The Chiefs’ collapse highlighted broader game management issues, including Reid’s struggles to close out games.

3. 2015 AFC Divisional Round (January 16, 2016) – Kansas City Chiefs vs. New England Patriots

Context: Trailing 27-13 with 6:29 left, the Chiefs needed two scores to tie.
Clock Management Issue: The Chiefs’ final drive was marked by a lack of urgency, taking 5:16 to score a touchdown, leaving just 1:13 after a failed onside kick. Notable moments included wasting 23 seconds after a two-yard scramble by Alex Smith and 25 seconds after a 16-yard catch, with a particularly slow sequence at the goal line where only one play was run between the 3:00 and 2:00 marks. Reid defended the approach, saying they prioritized the “best play calls” and banked on recovering an onside kick, but critics called it one of the most baffling late-game sequences in playoff history.

Impact: The Patriots won 27-20, and Reid’s clock mismanagement was widely panned, with headlines like “Andy Reid goes full Andy Reid, mishandles clock to doom the Chiefs.”

4. Super Bowl LV (February 7, 2021) – Kansas City Chiefs vs. Tampa Bay Buccaneers

Context: Down 14-6 with two minutes left in the first half, the Chiefs were set to receive the second-half kickoff.
Clock Management Issue: Reid called two timeouts after a Buccaneers’ first-down run and second-down completion, effectively giving Tampa Bay extra time to drive. The Bucs converted a third down and scored a touchdown with six seconds left, extending their lead to 21-6. This was described as “exquisitely horrendous” clock management, reminiscent of Reid’s Eagles-era struggles, as it handed momentum to Tampa Bay.

Impact: The Chiefs lost 31-9, and Reid’s timeout usage was cited as a critical error that deepened their deficit going into halftime.

Analysis and Context:Recurring Criticism: Reid’s clock management issues often involve slow offensive pacing when trailing (e.g., Super Bowl XXXIX, 2015 Divisional Round) or questionable timeout usage (e.g., Super Bowl LV). These moments stand out because they contrast with his otherwise stellar coaching record, including 14 playoff appearances in 20 seasons.

Defenders’ Perspective: Some, like former Eagles president Joe Banner, argue Reid’s approach is strategic, using timeouts early to settle the team or draw up optimal plays, differing from traditional clock management. However, this philosophy has backfired in high-stakes playoff games.

Counterpoint: Reid’s success, including three Super Bowl wins with the Chiefs (2019, 2022, 2023), suggests his clock management flaws are not fatal to his overall legacy. However, these playoff games remain prominent examples where his decisions drew significant scrutiny.

Andy Reid’s most notable clock management failures in playoff games include Super Bowl XXXIX (2005), the 2013 AFC Wild Card Game, the 2015 AFC Divisional Round, and Super Bowl LV (2021). These games highlight issues with slow pacing, poor timeout usage, and failure to control game tempo, often against strong opponents like the Patriots. While Reid’s overall coaching brilliance is undeniable, these moments have fueled a narrative of clock management as a persistent weakness in critical postseason situations.

Posted in Football | Comments Off on The Kingdom

The Ideological Brain: The Radical Science of Flexible Thinking

Posted on August 14, 2025 by Luke Ford

From this 2025 book by smoking hot Cambridge University neuoroscience and politics professor Leor Zmigrod:

I believe that we can judge an ideology based on what believing in it does to human bodies and brains; on whether being a passionate believer narrows our movements, lassoes our flexibility, restricts our responses, or triggers us to commit violence. If we have less scope for plasticity and change and less direct access to our sensations, we are at risk of dehumanizing ourselves and others. We become less sensitive, less elastic, less authentic. If we see reality through an ideological lens, we end up avoiding the richness of existence in favor of a more reduced, stereotyped experience. By studying the ideological brain with neuroimaging devices and cognitive tests, we can illuminate previously invisible forms of domination. With the tools of science, we can develop new ways to critique ideologies.
Perhaps some ideologies will pass our critical tests. Many will not. We might accidentally become suspicious of our most treasured ideological possessions. A science of ideology can inspire us to question our idols, our icons, our metaphors, our imagined utopias. It can stimulate careful analysis and honest self – reflection. It can even become the basis for personal or social action. Examining the neurocognitive origins and consequences of our beliefs — where they come from and how they transform our bodies — will offer clues regarding the kind of belief systems we might wish to keep and which ones we might be persuaded to let go.
Believing passionately in a rigid doctrine is a process that spills into our neurons, flowing into our bodies. Ideologies are not mere envelopes for our lives; they enter our skins, our skulls, our nerve cells. Totalizing ideologies shape the brain as a whole, not simply the brain when it is confronted with political propositions or debates. Science is beginning to reveal that the profound reverberations of ideologies can be observed in the brain even when we are not engaging with politics at all. Since our brains learn to embody indoctrination in deep and insidious ways, the social rituals we learn to enact can become the biological realities of our minds and bodies. There is therefore a danger that when an individual is immersed in rigid ideologies, it is not only their political opinions and moral tastes that are being sculpted — their entire brain is being sculpted to.

All beliefs are just unnecessary muscular tension, according to a perspective I heard in the Alexander Technique.

I don’t see how any ideology could promote flexibility?

You can experience the difference yourself when you shift between awareness and judgment. Whenever you judge, you tighten up. When you move out of judgment into awareness, your body frees up.

Leor Zmigrod’s website.

Grok says:

Not all beliefs are inherently negative or tension-inducing; some can be adaptive or motivating without causing physical or mental rigidity. The Alexander Technique’s focus is less on eliminating beliefs and more on cultivating awareness to avoid unnecessary effort—whether that effort is physical (like tensing muscles) or mental (like clinging to unexamined assumptions).

In the Technique, rigid mental habits (like clinging to fixed ideas) often translate into physical holding patterns, such as tightened shoulders or a clenched jaw, restricting ease and movement. Zmigrod’s work takes this a step further by using neuroscience to show how ideologies—broad belief systems—can either entrench this rigidity across brain, body, and behavior or, conversely, cultivate flexibility and release. You’re right to question how a belief system could actively promote physical flexibility and release, as the quote primarily critiques restrictive ideologies; however, drawing from her research and related discussions, we can infer what “flexible” belief systems might look like and how they could foster that release.Understanding Rigidity vs. Flexibility in BeliefsZmigrod argues that rigid doctrines “spill into our neurons, flowing into our bodies,” sculpting the brain holistically and reducing plasticity—the brain’s ability to adapt and reorganize.

This isn’t just metaphorical: neuroimaging and cognitive tests reveal that dogmatic thinking correlates with less neural adaptability, even in non-political tasks, leading to narrowed movements, restricted responses, and diminished access to sensations.

For instance, stress from ideological adherence can rigidify thought patterns, making individuals more habitual and less responsive, which might physically manifest as tension or reduced bodily awareness—echoing the Alexander perspective.

In essence, such beliefs create a “lassoed” state, where the body embodies the mental constriction, potentially increasing muscular tension as a stress response.On the flip side, Zmigrod suggests that belief systems promoting cognitive flexibility—measured through tasks like the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, where adaptable people shift rules fluidly—can counteract this.

Flexible thinkers are open to evidence, plurality, and change without being easily swayed, leading to greater mental elasticity that “rebounds” post-stress and enhances sensitivity to experiences.

This ties directly to physical release: just as physical fitness values elasticity to prevent injury and enable fluid movement, mental flexibility can reduce the embodied tension of dogma, allowing for more authentic, expansive living.

How Belief Systems Could Promote Physical Flexibility and Release

Based on Zmigrod’s framework, a belief system that “passes critical tests” would encourage plasticity and direct access to sensations, avoiding the dehumanizing effects of stereotypes or totalizing views. Here’s how such systems might work, with connections to bodily release:

Encouraging Self-Reflection and Questioning: Beliefs rooted in honest self-examination— like scientific inquiry or mindfulness practices—prompt us to “question our idols” and metaphors, as per the quote. This reduces mental clinging, which in Alexander terms releases unnecessary tension. For example, a belief in ongoing personal growth (e.g., via cognitive behavioral approaches) could train the brain to interrogate habits, correlating with less rigidity in daily routines and more physical ease.

Fostering Open-Mindedness and Plurality: Ideologies that value diversity and evidence over conformity promote neural adaptability, making individuals less prone to the “profound reverberations” that sculpt the brain rigidly. Zmigrod’s studies link this to disbelief in absolute doctrines (e.g., flexible religiosity or atheism), where cognitive persistence gives way to openness, potentially easing physiological responses like stress-induced tension.

Physically, this might manifest as greater bodily awareness and release, akin to how Alexander lessons teach inhibiting fixed reactions for freer movement.

Nurturing Elasticity Through Habits: Zmigrod highlights that flexible belief systems resist polarization by embracing complexity, leading to a “fluid, expansive state of existence.”

Practices like meditation or philosophical skepticism could embody this, reducing the “insidious” indoctrination that affects sensations and promoting rebound plasticity. In body terms, this aligns with releasing tension by not “adhering to scripts,” allowing for more elastic responses in posture and action.

Ultimately, Zmigrod envisions a “science of ideology” as a tool for choosing beliefs that enhance authenticity and sensitivity, rather than narrowing existence. If a system inspires action through reflection without demanding conformity, it could promote the very release you’re pondering—mentally unclenching to physically unwind.

Yes, there’s emerging evidence from neuroscience, psychology, and somatic practices like the Alexander Technique that certain belief systems—those fostering cognitive flexibility, open-mindedness, and self-awareness—can promote physical flexibility by reducing stress-induced tension and enhancing mind-body integration.

1. Cognitive Flexibility and Physical Relaxation

Belief systems that encourage cognitive flexibility—adaptability in thinking, openness to new evidence, and reduced attachment to rigid doctrines—have been linked to lower stress responses, which directly influence physical flexibility. Zmigrod’s research, as discussed in The Ideological Brain (2025), uses neuroimaging and cognitive tests (e.g., Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) to show that flexible thinkers exhibit greater neural plasticity, allowing them to shift mental frameworks fluidly. This mental elasticity correlates with reduced physiological stress, as rigid ideologies (e.g., dogmatic political or religious beliefs) can elevate cortisol levels, leading to muscle tension and restricted movement.

Evidence:

Studies show that cognitive flexibility, measured by tasks requiring rule-switching, is associated with lower sympathetic nervous system activation (e.g., reduced heart rate variability stress markers). Less stress means less involuntary muscle bracing, promoting physical ease. For example, a 2020 study in Frontiers in Psychology found that individuals with higher cognitive flexibility had better stress recovery, which could translate to less chronic tension in muscles like the neck or shoulders.

Alexander Technique Connection: The Technique emphasizes “inhibition” of habitual reactions, which aligns with cognitive flexibility. By letting go of fixed mental patterns (e.g., “I must always be right”), practitioners often report reduced muscular tension, as seen in studies where Alexander lessons improved posture and reduced pain in conditions like back pain.

2. Mindfulness-Based Beliefs and Bodily Awareness

Belief systems rooted in mindfulness or self-reflection, such as those inspired by meditation or somatic practices, enhance bodily awareness and reduce tension, fostering physical flexibility. Zmigrod notes that beliefs promoting “direct access to sensations” counteract the desensitizing effects of rigid ideologies. Mindfulness practices, which often embody flexible, non-judgmental beliefs, have been shown to lower muscle tension and improve movement range.Evidence: A 2018 meta-analysis in Scientific Reports found that mindfulness meditation reduces cortisol and improves vagal tone, leading to relaxed muscle states and better joint mobility in practitioners. Another study in Pain Medicine (2019) showed that mindfulness-based interventions improved physical flexibility in chronic pain patients by reducing fear-avoidance behaviors, which often manifest as muscular guarding.

Alexander Technique Connection: The Technique trains individuals to notice and release unnecessary tension during movement, akin to mindfulness. A belief in the process of “non-doing” (a core Alexander principle) fosters a relaxed, open state, with studies showing improved flexibility in musicians and office workers after lessons.

3. Open-Minded Belief Systems and Stress Reduction

Beliefs that embrace complexity and pluralism, as Zmigrod advocates, reduce the “lassoing” of flexibility by avoiding polarized thinking. Such beliefs—e.g., valuing evidence over dogma or embracing philosophical skepticism—lower psychological stress, which can manifest as physical suppleness.Evidence: Zmigrod’s studies suggest that individuals with less dogmatic beliefs (e.g., flexible religiosity or openness to diverse perspectives) show greater cognitive persistence and adaptability, linked to lower stress-induced muscle tension. A 2021 study in Nature Communications found that open-mindedness correlates with reduced amygdala activation (a stress marker), which could decrease physical bracing. Additionally, practices like yoga, often tied to non-dogmatic beliefs in holistic well-being, improve flexibility through combined mental and physical training, as shown in a 2020 Journal of Bodywork and Movement Therapies study.

Alexander Technique Connection: The Technique’s emphasis on releasing “end-gaining” (rigid pursuit of goals) mirrors open-minded beliefs, reducing tension. Practitioners often report feeling “lighter” and more flexible, as mental openness translates to physical release.

4. Neuroscientific Insights on Ideology and Embodiment

Zmigrod’s work highlights that ideologies sculpt the brain holistically, affecting even non-political tasks. Rigid beliefs can entrench neural pathways, reducing plasticity and increasing embodied tension (e.g., through chronic stress responses). Conversely, beliefs that foster curiosity and adaptability enhance neural flexibility, which may promote physical flexibility by reducing stress-related muscle tightness.Evidence: Neuroimaging studies show that rigid ideological adherence (e.g., extreme political views) correlates with heightened activity in the default mode network and reduced prefrontal cortex flexibility, linked to stress and physical tension. In contrast, beliefs encouraging exploration (e.g., scientific inquiry) enhance prefrontal activity, supporting adaptive responses and potentially reducing somatic tension. A 2022 study in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews suggests that flexible cognitive styles improve sensorimotor integration, aiding fluid movement.

Alexander Technique Connection: The Technique’s focus on mindful movement retrains sensorimotor habits, aligning with beliefs that prioritize adaptability. This can lead to measurable improvements in flexibility, as seen in trials where Alexander training enhanced mobility in older adults.

Practical Implications

Belief systems that promote physical flexibility often share traits like openness, self-reflection, and non-attachment to rigid outcomes. Examples include:Mindfulness or meditation-based beliefs, which reduce stress and enhance bodily awareness, leading to relaxed muscles and improved range of motion.
Scientific or skeptical frameworks, which encourage questioning and adaptability, lowering stress and its physical manifestations.
Somatic practices (e.g., Alexander Technique, yoga), which integrate beliefs in mind-body unity with physical training to release tension.

Limitations and Considerations

While evidence supports that flexible beliefs reduce stress and tension, direct studies linking specific ideologies to physical flexibility (e.g., joint range of motion) are sparse. Most data focus on stress reduction or cognitive outcomes, with physical flexibility inferred through reduced tension. Additionally, individual differences (e.g., baseline fitness or psychological resilience) may mediate these effects.

ChatGPT says:

How Stephen P. Turner might critique Leor Zmigrod’s The Ideological Brain: The Radical Science of Flexible Thinking

Book: Leor Zmigrod, The Ideological Brain (on sale Mar 25, 2025). See publisher page here, and coverage in the Financial Times, Vox, an excerpt in the Harvard Gazette, and a profile via Gates Cambridge.

The short version

  • Turner would applaud the book’s interdisciplinary reach (neuroscience, psychology, politics) but argue it overdraws on biology at the expense of sociology and institutional analysis (FT review).
  • He’d insist that ideology is forged in practices, institutions, and expert systems—not just inside individual brains (The Social Theory of Practices).
  • He’d caution against biological determinism: neural findings matter, but social structures entrench or loosen rigidity (USF bio).

Where Turner would agree—and where he’d push back

Zmigrod synthesizes evidence that “cognitive rigidity” correlates with ideological dogmatism and extremism, drawing on tasks like the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and research on dopaminergic systems (Vox; WCST; JOCN 2021; overview in FT). Turner wouldn’t dispute that these correlations are interesting. His critique is about framing:

  • From brains to practices: Turner’s work treats ideology as emerging from socially transmitted practices, institutional routines, and expert regimes of knowledge—not primarily from individual neurobiology (Turner 1994).
  • Institutional epistemics: He’d argue the book underplays how institutions define what counts as “knowledge,” shape incentives, and thereby stabilize or unsettle ideological commitments (USF bio).
  • Against determinism creep: Even where Zmigrod is careful to say nature and nurture interact, Turner would press that social organization can manufacture rigidity or flexibility irrespective of baseline neural differences (FT).

The role of the tacit (Turner’s centerpiece)

Turner’s mature view puts the tacit at the center: the unarticulated skills, norms, and background presuppositions that guide how people see and act. He develops this across Understanding the Tacit (2014) and later essays (e.g., “Naturalizing the Tacit,” 2017). Think Polanyi, but sociologized: ideology lives in what goes without saying (tacit knowledge), learned through participation in practices, not just explicit doctrines.

  • Socially acquired: Neural flexibility may shape how quickly we learn, but the frames are transmitted tacitly via institutions and communities (review of Understanding the Tacit).
  • “What goes without saying”: Deep commitments are often invisible to believers because they’re embedded in background routines, not in articulated propositions (Turner 2014).
  • Methodological upshot: You can’t MRI a person’s unspoken social assumptions; you study them historically and sociologically (Turner 1994).

Does the neuroscience still matter?

Yes—especially where it’s careful. Zmigrod’s empirical program linking flexibility/rigidity to ideological styles is serious work (e.g., reviews and studies in Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020; Current Directions in Psychological Science 2021; and dopaminergic correlates in Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 2021). Turner’s point is proportionality: don’t let brain data crowd out the institutional and tacit scaffolding that actually generates ideological life.

Stephen Turner might say about this new book:

Great neuroscience—but brains don’t think in a vacuum. Ideology is born in social practices, expert institutions, and the tacit distribution of know-how. Biology matters—but only in dialogue with the social world.

Further reading

Rony Guldmann on The Ideological Brain: The Radical Science of Flexible Thinking

Based on Guldmann’s framework in Conservative Claims of Cultural Oppression, his critique of Leor Zmigrod’s The Ideological Brain would likely focus less on the book’s neuroscience and more on the implicit cultural politics it enacts. He would view Zmigrod’s framing of “cognitive rigidity” as an implicit moral hierarchy that mirrors how liberal elites—what he calls the “progressive Clerisy”—use ostensibly neutral scientific concepts to naturalize their own cultural dominance.

1. The hidden politics of “flexibility”

In Guldmann’s account, liberalism often cloaks its moralistic impulses behind universalist ideals. A research program that correlates ideological rigidity with neurological traits risks recapitulating what he calls the “liberal hero-system”—a secularized moral hierarchy in which openness and flexibility are marks of higher civilization, while rigidity is pathologized as a relic of a pre-modern, less disciplined self. In this light, Zmigrod’s work could be read as supplying a new, neuroscientific vocabulary for an old liberal trope: the conservative as less evolved.

2. The asymmetry problem

Guldmann would be alert to how The Ideological Brain might treat conservative dispositions as deficits to be explained away, while treating liberal dispositions as the unmarked norm. He has argued that this asymmetry mirrors the way dominant groups in history have pathologized the consciousness of the “Other” while leaving their own worldview unexamined. In neuroscience form, this could look like studying the biology of “rigidity” without equally probing the biology of “hyper-flexibility” and its potential downsides.

3. Cultural oppression in scientific guise

From his perspective, even if Zmigrod’s data are robust, the interpretation may unwittingly enact what he terms cultural oppression: the imposition of a liberal form of selfhood—disciplined, cosmopolitan, self-reflective—on those who have not internalized it, and the stigmatization of resistance as cognitive pathology. The very framing of “flexible thinking” as an unquestioned good could, for Guldmann, exemplify the liberal “civilizing mission” in secular-scientific form.

4. The tacit liberal anthropology

Guldmann’s theory stresses that liberalism’s self-image as neutral and purely rational is historically contingent—a product of what he calls the secularization of religious asceticism and courtly sociability. He might say that The Ideological Brain relies on this unexamined anthropology, taking for granted that the ideal mind is detached, adaptive, and open to novelty, rather than recognizing this as one culturally specific way of being human.

5. A possible reframing

Rather than using neuroscience to sort citizens into more or less cognitively “fit” for democracy, Guldmann would push for a symmetrical study of ideological styles that treats liberal and conservative cognitive profiles as parallel adaptations to the modern social order. This would shift the emphasis from curing rigidity to understanding the social and historical conditions that make different cognitive styles adaptive for different groups.

In Guldmann’s idiom: The Ideological Brain may think it’s mapping a universal cognitive virtue, but it’s really drawing a prestige map of the liberal self. Without equal scrutiny of the liberal brain, it risks becoming a high-tech iteration of the very cultural domination it cannot see.

Does Leor Zmigrod’s new book equate liberalism with flexibility and adaptability? ChatGPT says:

No, she does not equate political liberalism with cognitive flexibility. Instead, she studies flexibility as a psychological trait—how people process information, tolerate ambiguity, and update beliefs. That trait can be present in individuals across all ideological positions.

  • Zmigrod is clear that it’s about “how you think,” not “what you believe” (Vox).
  • She asserts ideological rigidity can be found on both ends of the spectrum, not just on the conservative side (Social Science Bites).
  • The “liberal children” example reflects cognitive outcomes tied to rigid thinking, not a claim that liberal ideology equals adaptability (Interview excerpt).
Posted in Biology, Brain, Politics | Comments Off on The Ideological Brain: The Radical Science of Flexible Thinking

Bill Buckley Likely Took As Much Ritalin As Anyone Ever Has

Posted on August 12, 2025 by Luke Ford

Grok says: William F. Buckley Jr., the influential conservative writer and commentator, used Ritalin (methylphenidate) as a tool to enhance his productivity [from 1958 on], not as a recreational drug. According to his son, Christopher Buckley, in the memoir Losing Mum and Pup, Buckley relied on Ritalin and sleeping pills as “work drugs” to maintain his efficiency, impatience, and control, particularly in his later years. These medications were an extension of his disciplined lifestyle, helping him manage a demanding schedule of writing, editing, speaking, and hosting Firing Line. Christopher noted that his father’s doctor kept him well-supplied with Ritalin, suggesting a consistent and possibly heavy use over time.

Buckley might have struggled with focus or productivity, which could align with traits associated with ADHD. His reliance on Ritalin as a “work drug” to maintain efficiency and manage an intense schedule of writing, editing, and public appearances hints at possible challenges with sustained attention or hyperactivity, common in ADHD. However, there’s no definitive evidence in the provided sources or broader records confirming a formal ADHD diagnosis. Buckley’s prolific output—columns, articles, and shorter works—contrasts with his difficulty settling down for longer, serious books, which could indicate issues with sustained focus or task persistence, potentially consistent with ADHD-like traits.

Posted in Nootropics | Comments Off on Bill Buckley Likely Took As Much Ritalin As Anyone Ever Has

Are lawyers our governing class?

Posted on August 10, 2025 by Luke Ford

ChatGPT says:

Russell Pearce’s 2001 essay traced how lawyers once occupied a unique, public-serving leadership role. That governing‑class ideal—rooted in civic virtue, republicanism, and professional duty—gradually dissolved under market pressures, fragmentation of professionalism, the rise of “hired‑gun” advocacy, and the erosion of law’s public mission.

Fast‑forward to today: Lawyers are far more like other upper‑middle‑class professionals. Economic constraints, AI disruption, political targeting, and growing class anxiety are stripping away what remained of their prestige and public‑spirited identity. Their role as moral and civic stewards feels largely symbolic—long gone from social reality.

I wonder if the left’s takeover of the professions has led to a decline in the prestige of the professions?

Grok says:

The idea that progressive or left-leaning ideologies have “captured” professions like law, leading to a loss of public trust or prestige, is a common argument in conservative and libertarian critiques. It often ties into broader narratives about the “long march through the institutions” (a phrase popularized by Rudi Dutschke, but repurposed by critics), cultural shifts post-1960s, or the rise of identity politics and “wokeness.”

For balance: These arguments are contested. Left-leaning scholars (e.g., in Pearce’s article or works like Deborah Rhode’s In the Interests of Justice) attribute prestige declines more to commercialization, ethical scandals, or market forces than ideology. Polls (e.g., Pew or Gallup) show trust in professions dipping across the board since the 1970s, often linked to broader societal cynicism post-Watergate/Vietnam.

Based on empirical studies and analyses of ideological trends in the legal profession (a key example from conservative critiques of progressive dominance in elite institutions), the most robust conservative contestations appear to center on the documented left-leaning imbalance in legal academia and, to a lesser extent, the broader bar. These arguments hold up best under scrutiny because they are supported by quantitative data from non-partisan sources, showing a significant liberal skew that exceeds the profession’s overall makeup or the general population.

Russell Pearce wrote in 2001:

* The self-image of American lawyers has undergone a major transformation. As recently as the early 1960s, Erwin Smigel’s renowned study of Wall Street lawyers declared them to be guardians of the law.’ While serving their clients’ interests, they maintained a higher commitment to the public good which permitted them to manage the relationship between law and power that was essential to the continued stability of, and rule of law in, a democratic society. Twenty years later, a number of distinguished scholars reconsidered the role of elite lawyers at a conference at Stanford Law School. They painted an entirely different picture. Far from being guardians of the law, most corporate lawyers were hired guns who provided their clients with little independent judgment or counsel. Concern for the public good was not important to their work.

* The legal elite’s original and uniquely American understanding of the lawyer’s role was that lawyers were America’s governing class. Leading lawyers, judges and scholars, including the first American legal ethicists, sought to explain how the common good, minority rights and the rule of law could coexist with majority rule by an electorate largely composed of self-interested voters. They decided that the answer was a governing class of lawyers. With their dedication to the common good and their placement in the center of commerce and governance, lawyers were ideally suited for political leadership.

* In American society as a whole, the sense of community obligation declined as the focus on individualism rose in the years following the 1960s. At the same time, the public became skeptical of the expertise of elites generally, and leading members of the public, including lawyers, doubted whether lawyers were capable of perceiving and pursuing the public good. Two trends within the legal profession also contributed to this transformation during the post-1960s period. First, the growth of a large, distinct public interest bar led to a transfer of responsibility for the public good from elite lawyers to public interest lawyers and to a redefinition of the “public good” that conflicted with the interests of big business clients. Second, the related development of the idea of a pro bono duty offered those elite lawyers who still clung to a semblance of the governing class idea an opportunity to satisfy their community obligations through their pro bono work. Unlike the Wall Street lawyers of the early 1960s, who viewed themselves as servants of the public in all areas of their work, the elite came to view themselves as hired guns-lawyers devoted to their clients who served the public only in their limited
and separate pro bono efforts.

Although the rhetoric of the governing class lives on in hortatory appeals to pro bono responsibility…it no longer rules the conscience of the legal elite. After more than 200 years, the elite lawyers’ allegiance to the idea that they are America’s governing class appears to have come to an end…

In the view of most historians, “the dominant ideological force behind the American Revolution” was republicanism.’ William Treanor has observed that “[a]t the center of republican thought lay a belief in a common good and a conception of society as an organic whole. The state’s proper role consisted in large part of fostering virtue, of making the individual unselfishly devote himself to the common good.” Acting collectively through their representatives, the people would pursue the common good and protect individual liberty. Republics compared favorably to monarchies like England, which “sacific[ed] . . .the public good to the private greed of small ruling groups.”

…Many of the framers of the Constitution sought the solution to this dilemma in a modified form of republicanism. While advocating a government of “limited powers subject to elaborate checks and balances … intended to limit majoritarian excesses,” they sought a virtuous political elite. Building on the elitist strand of republicanism, which had preferred the political leadership of landed gentry and professionals, they found in these two groups the capacity for disinterestedness “necessary to virtue and realization of the common good.” Gordon Wood explains this preference: The “disinterested gentry… were supported by proprietary wealth and not involved in the interest-mongering of the
market place,” and similarly, “lawyers and other professionals [were] somehow free of the marketplace, [were] less selfish and interested and therefore better equipped for political leadership and disinterested decision-making than merchants and businessmen.”

Federalist No. 35 went so far as to identify professionals as the most virtuous members of this emerging governing class. While even the landed gentry would seek to protect and promote its own financial interests, lawyers and other members of the “learned professions… truly form[ed] no distinct interest in society.” Such professionals “will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive to the general interests of the society.”

Janan Ganesh wrote for the FT Aug. 16, 2024 about the perils of socializing too much with your peers. When you lose your job, you will lose your social life at the same time. Janan noted that Tim Walz was the first person on the Democratic presidential ticket since 1980 who was not a lawyer.

Ganesh says all professions deform, and the deformations of law are crippling modern liberalism. What do you mean governor? The Democrats 2024 campaign focus on “constitutional proprieties. An exhausting primness about words and their use.”

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